Replication data for: Why underachievers dominate secret police organizations: Evidence from autocratic Argentina
| Item Type: | Dataset |
|---|---|
| Title: | Replication data for: Why underachievers dominate secret police organizations: Evidence from autocratic Argentina |
| Date: | 23 August 2019 |
| Creator: |
Scharpf, Adam ; Gläßel, Christian  ORCID: 0000-0002-0041-3855
|
| Divisions: | Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences- CDSS (Social Sciences) School of Social Sciences > Political Scinece, International Relations (Carey 2010-) |
| DDC Classification: |
320 Political science |
|---|---|
| Abstract: | Autocrats depend on a capable secret police. Anecdotal evidence, however, often characterizes agents as surprisingly mediocre in skill and intellect. To explain this puzzle, this paper focuses on the career incentives underachieving individuals face in the regular security apparatus. Low-performing officials in hierarchical organizations have little chance of being promoted or filling lucrative positions. To salvage their careers, these officials are willing to undertake burdensome secret police work. Using data on all 4,287 officers who served in autocratic Argentina (1975-83), we study biographic differences between secret police agents and the entire recruitment pool. We find that low-achieving officers were stuck within the regime hierarchy, threatened with discharge, and thus more likely to join the secret police for future benefits. The study demonstrates how state bureaucracies breed mundane career concerns that produce willing enforcers and cement violent regimes. This has implications for the understanding of autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown. (English) |
| External Identifier for Data: | https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PGFOXW |
| URL: | https://madata.bib.uni-mannheim.de/709/ |
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| Access (Controlled): | Only Metadata |
| License (Controlled): | No license information available, not specified, or non-standard license |
| Related Publication(s) in MADOC: | Scharpf, Adam und Gläßel, Christian (2020), Why underachievers dominate secret police organizations: Evidence from autocratic Argentina |
Full text not available from this repository.
| Date Deposited: | 09 Apr 2026 15:15 |
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| Last Modified: | 09 Apr 2026 15:15 |
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